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CRITICISM OF INTERVIEW-BASED QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Older criticism of interviews focused on issues like:

a)	‘how do we know the informant is telling the truth’, and are the truths we are interested in stable across situations and perspectives? 

[See Dean, J. P. and Whyte, W. F. (1958) ‘How do you know if the informant is telling the truth?’, Human Organization, 17, 2, pp34-8. This article and that by Becker and Geer referred to below are reprinted in G. McCall and J. L. Simmons: Issues in Participant Observation, Reading MS, Addison-Wesley, 1969. They are also discussed in P. Atkinson, A. Coffey and S. Delamont (2003) Key Themes in Qualitative Research: continuities and change, Walnut Creek CA, Altamira]

b)	the ‘incompleteness’ of interview data as compared with the data that could be gained from participant observation 

[See Becker, H. S. and Geer, B. (1957) ‘Participant observation and interviewing: a comparison’, Human Organization, 16, 3, pp28-32. See also the response by Trow and the reply from Becker and Geer. ]

c)	the difference between what people say and what they actually do 

[Deutscher, I. (1973) What We Say/What We Do: Sentiments and acts, Glenview IL, Scott, Foresman and Co.]

These arguments did not generally lead to rejection of the use of interview data in standard ways, but amounted simply to warnings about the limits to what could be inferred from such data. The usual implication was that interviews must be combined with other methods.






Three, rather different, arguments seem to underlie this radical critique:

a)	What we might call ‘severe methodological caution’, which amounts to a radicalisation of earlier criticisms of interviewing: where previous critics simply urged care in using interview data in the two standard ways I have outlined, some of the radical critics deny that we can depend on interview data at all in these ways. They suggest that these forms of inference are simply too speculative, now that we recognise how context-sensitive what people say and do is, and therefore how unreliable it may be as a source of information, in comparison with the researcher’s own observations. 

b)	A second criticism challenges one of the key rationales for interviews developed by qualitative researchers: that it gives access to personal understandings and knowledge that only the person him or herself has access to. Here, there is rejection of the idea that what people say somehow represents, or derives from, what goes on inside their heads. This is part of a general philosophical argument that challenges the idea that we can have private experiences. Instead, it is insisted that mind must be viewed as behaviour and therefore as always publicly available rather than somehow internal to the person. [For a sophisticated (but very long!) philosophical assessment of this argument that comes to the conclusion that people do have access to some information about their own beliefs that others do not, albeit not information unmediated by language or whose validity is guaranteed, see H. H. Price Belief, London, Allen and Unwin, 1969.]

c)	A third argument draws on the epistemological scepticism that is widespread in the literature on social research methodology today: questioning the idea that accounts can ever represent reality at all, whether this is ‘external’ reality or ‘internal’ subjective reality. Here, even accounts of what happened in some publicly observable situation are treated not as true or false, but rather as constitutive - as producing one of many possible versions of reality. Thus, reality is constituted in the telling, rather than being independent of the telling. 

d)	

